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This article uses the multiple and contradictory realities of Melilla, a pene-enclave and -exclave 
of Spain in North Africa, to draw out the contemporary practice of Spanish, European Union, 
and Moroccan immigration enforcement policies. The city is many things at once: a piece of 
Europe in North Africa and a symbol of Spain’s colonial history; an example of the 
contemporary narrative of a cosmopolitan and multicultural Europe; a place where 
extraterritorial and intraterritorial dynamics demonstrate territory’s continuing allure despite the 
security challenges and the lack of economic or strategic value; a metaphorical island of 
contrasting geopolitical and biopolitical practices; and a place of regional flows and cross-border 
cooperation between Spain, the EU, and Morocco. It is a border where the immunitary logic of 
sovereign territorial spaces is exposed through the biopolitical practices of the state to ‘protect’ 
the community from outsiders. In light of the hardening of borders throughout European and 
North African space in recent years, this article offers a rich case study of our persistently 
territorial world. 
 




INTRODUCTION: OSAMA AND ABOU 
 
Body of immigrant minor found dead in the lighthouse area of Melilla. (Headline, 
Gálvez, 2015) 
 
On our first day in Melilla we were meeting with an activist at a café when a teenage boy 
approached our table and asked for change. He was one of a few dozen youth who live on the 
rocks along the ocean beside the port and try to sneak onto the ferries or climb into containers 
headed for mainland Europe. It is a desperate and unlikely route, and the activist noted that many 
of the same boys she worked with in the city had been there when she arrived five months 
earlier. The activist shook her head, ‘no’, and said to the boy with a sad smile, ‘mañana, 
inshallah’, tomorrow, god willing. He ran off and re-joined his friends who were heading in the 
direction of Melilla Vieja, the port area. 
 
The next morning the Guardia Civil, Spain’s gendarmerie, raided the makeshift camp at the port, 
using boats, helicopters, and agents on the ground to round up and detain the group of homeless 
boys. In the raid, which was front page news in Melilla, the Guardia Civil captured over 30 
‘Magrebi’ youth, built a new observation cubicle, and installed new locks on the gates. 
Nevertheless, when we visited the site the morning after the raid there were three boys sleeping 
on the rocks, suggesting that the boys had accepted the challenge that the new gates and fence 
posed by taking a presumably more treacherous path (Figure 1). The new observation cubicle 
was empty, but there was a Guardia Civil on duty at another nearby observation point. He barely 
looked up from his cell phone to say buenos días as we – two white academics who evidently 
aroused little suspicion – walked by. It is unlikely that Osama, the boy who fell to his death 
along the rocky shore some two months after we were in Melilla, was the same boy who had 
asked us for change, but like the young men we saw sleeping on cardboard mats atop craggy 
limestone outcroppings, Osama represents the utter senselessness of people dying at the ‘gates’ 
of Europe and the callous indifference of states seeking to restrict mobilities (Vazquez, 2015). In 
December 2015 and March 2016, three more boys drowned attempting to stowaway on ships at 
the Melilla port (The Local, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1. Boys sleeping on rocks near Melilla’s port. 
 
The lengths to which some migrants will go to cross the border was demonstrated by the case of 
another boy snared in Spain’s North African security regime.1 In May 2015, Abou, an eight-
year-old from Ivory Coast, was discovered crammed in a suitcase by an x-ray machine at a 
border crossing in Ceuta in an attempt to be reunited with his father in Spain (Kirkpatrick, 2015). 
The experiences of Osama and Abou illustrate the multitude of indignities endured en route to 
Europe: scaling the multi-layer fence that has made Melilla and its sister enclave Ceuta 
(in)famous; deportation and starting the journey to Europe again; begging for change and food; 
and enduring abuse at the hands of smugglers and police. The hardening of border enforcement 
and the disinclination of some European leaders to ensure safe crossing has resulted in Europe’s 
borders becoming the deadliest on earth with over 20,000 deaths in the past 10 years 
(Bialasiewicz, 2011; Brian & Laczko, 2014; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2014). The 
international media spectacle of border crossings draws sporadic waves of coverage before the 
waters calm and the quotidian life of living with the border goes on, mostly unnoticed. 
 
For migrants there are real material impacts from the expansion of security services, the 
construction of walls and fences, and the deployment of a wide range of new military 
technologies at borders (Saddiki, 2012; Vallet, 2014; Vallet & David, 2012). It is much harder to 
cross this border – and many other hardened borders around the world – than it was two decades 
ago, a fact that points to the partial success of these practices. Border forces are also cracking 
down on the locations where migrants gather to attempt to cross a border, as demonstrated by the 
clearance of the Melilla port camp on 10 March 2015 and the earlier clearance of migrant camps 
on Mount Gurugu in Morocco on 17 February 2015, which is discussed in depth below. 
However, while they may send a message that authorities are taking action, the fact is that these 
crackdowns do not solve the problem. This is evident in the appearance, the very next day, of the 
teenagers at the port. It is also evident in the migrants who continue to walk the streets of Nador, 
Morocco, looking for food or spare change, preparing to rush the fence around Melilla. The main 
camps in Morocco were destroyed and burnt down, but some migrants evaded the crackdown 
and more will continue to come. Indeed, on the same morning we observed the aftermath of the 
raid on the port, a group of migrants had rushed the fence with five making it across. Dozens 
more were caught on top of the outer fences, and after sitting there for twelve hours, they were 
eventually forced to return to Morocco. The dramatic raids by the Guardia Civil with air, land, 
and sea units make for good headlines, but also demonstrate that despite the hardening of the 
border and the pushing of the border out into Morocco, migrants will still attempt to cross into 
the EU. 
 
This article uses the multiple and contradictory realities of Melilla to draw out the contemporary 
practice of Spanish, EU, and Moroccan immigration enforcement policies. It is based on 
fieldwork in Melilla and Nador in March 2015 that included interviews with activists, residents, 
and migrants, observational visits to the border fence and border crossing sites, and analysis of 
government documents. The paper uses three different metaphors of Melilla as Europe, as a 
possession, and as an island to illustrate the central argument that the territoriality of borders in 
and around Europe is composed of a highly variegated geography of special zones and legal 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we use the term “migrant” to refer to anyone who is moving from one place to another. We chose not 
to use “refugee” because it is a state defined category from the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951) that legitimates some movements, largely those for political reasons, while delegitimizing others, 
such as environmental or economic reasons. 
regimes, what Mountz (2013, p. 830) has conceptualized as the ‘ambiguous spatial arrangements 
or “gray” zones through which sovereign power operates and is produced’. In the case of Melilla, 
the spatial ambiguity of the migration regime is rooted in a colonial history that established an 
extraterritorial presence of the Spanish crown, a presence that was consolidated during the period 
of modern Westphalian state-making as an integral appendage of Spain’s sovereign territory, and 
then most recently the legal status of which has been tied up with the Schengenization of 
European space. As a result of its unique geographies, Melilla offers evidence of the 
extraordinary spatial tactics of border control that the anthropologist Coutin (2010, p. 200) has 
observed in other immigration receiving states. 
 
The first substantive section describes the political and geographical position of Melilla as an 
enclave of Europe in North Africa, which illustrates Spain’s colonial history and the 
contemporary narrative of cosmopolitan and multicultural Europe. The second section considers 
why Spain continues to hold onto Melilla, and other extraterritorial possessions, which are 
security challenges and provide little economic or strategic value. The section theorizes the 
militarization of Melilla through the lens of territoriality, especially drawing on Murphy’s notion 
of territory’s continuing allure. The final section theorizes the contrasting geopolitical and 
biopolitical practices through the metaphor of Melilla as an island. It is at the border where 
Esposito’s immunitary logic of sovereign territorial spaces is exposed through the biopolitical 
practices of the state, which include the regulation of migrant bodies and the outsourcing of 
immigration enforcement and policing to Morocco, in order to ‘protect’ the community from 
outsiders who might pose a threat. The joint-funding and cross-border cooperation demonstrate 
that although Spain and Morocco continue to disagree on the status of Melilla, and also Ceuta, 
they increasingly see the border itself not as a site of conflict but of mutual interests in regulating 
and policing unauthorized movements. 
 
 
Figure 2. Locations of Melilla and Ceuta. 
 
MELILLA AS EUROPE: COLONIAL OUTPOST AND COSMOPOLITAN SPACE 
 
Melilla (Maliliyyah in Arabic) is an autonomous Spanish city on the North African coast with a 
population of approximately 85,000 people, 15% of whom are classified as foreigners 
(Ine, 2015). It is one of the five North African Territories under Spanish Supervision along with 
Ceuta, Penon de Vélez de la Gomera, Penon de Alhucémas and the Chafarinas Islands; together, 
these are often referred to as the Plazas de Soberania (sovereign territories) or 
simply Plazas (O’Reilly, 1994, for more detailed accounts of the history and geography of 
Melilla and Ceuta, see Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Gold, 2000) (Figure 2). 
 
The city has been inhabited since ancient times and is mentioned in the geography of Ptolemy. It 
has been a militarized garrison city for most of its existence. Melilla changed hands throughout 
the centuries in a manner similar to other North African and Southern Iberian cities as Roman, 
Phoenician, and Moorish empires came and went. For most of that period it was little more than 
a fort situated on a rock outcrop near the port, what is today known as Melilla Vieja. The high 
walls and impregnable position on cliffs above the sea demonstrate the legacy of enclaved space 
and walled exclusion from the surrounding landscape. 
 
Isabella and Ferdinand of Spain captured Melilla in 1497 as they extended their territorial control 
after the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula. The strategic goals of having outposts on the North 
African coast for the Spanish crown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries included 
defending against jihad, providing a logistical hub for the crusades, enhancing prestige as a 
Mediterranean power, housing inmates, and gaining a military advantage over rivals (Great 
Britain, Morocco, and others) in influencing the vital chokepoint of the Strait of Gibraltar 
(O’Reilly, 1994). From within the medieval walls of Melilla, the Spanish planned raids on Rifian 
Berbers, and the favor was returned by numerous sieges of the presidio by the Berbers 
(Andersson, 2014). Although relations between the Spanish and local populations could be 
hostile, from the very earliest days of occupation trading relations between colonizers and locals 
were also established. 
 
The Spanish maintained control of the city through battles and sieges in 1694–1696 and 1774–
1775. Spain and Morocco signed several agreements in the late nineteenth century that 
guaranteed Spanish sovereignty, but local Rifian Berbers continued to attempt to retake Melilla 
during battles in 1898 and 1910. In the aftermath of these campaigns, Spain extended its colonial 
control across northern Morocco, including the cities of Tangier and Tetuan in the form of a 
protectorate. Melilla has a particularly significant role in Spanish history because it served as the 
launching point for Francisco Franco’s nationalist troops at the beginning of the Spanish Civil 
War. It is the only city in Spain that still has a statue commemorating the Fascist dictator, 
although it was recently moved to a nondescript roadside location near the old fortress. 
 
Despite its long military history, Melilla’s local government emphasizes that the city is a 
cosmopolitan European space characterized by its modernist architecture and the mixing of four 
cultures. The symbol of the city is: म מم m which incorporates the letter M from Hindi, Arabic, 
Hebrew, and Spanish. The glossy brochure from the tourist agency explains: 
 
For those who have arrived from the Peninsula, the first noteworthy feature lies in the 
ethnical combination of its inhabitants, which manifests itself in the most routine 
activities and, more especially, n [sic] the cohabitation of its religious celebrations, such 
as Christian Easter, Muslim Ramadan, the Jewish Januká or the Hindu Diwali. … The 
magnitude of Melilla is to be measured by this complex social network that brims with 
vitality, and by its peaceful people, who have inherited the wisdom accumulated over 
centuries of cohabitation within a regime of diversity. 
 
Why the brochure only calls attention to the diversity to visitors ‘from the Peninsula’ is not clear, 
since there are far more visitors to the city from elsewhere in Africa. 
 
In the hotel elevator, a flyer written in the form of a first person narrative of a resident of Melilla 
projects a similar cosmopolitan image. The author recommends a visit to: ‘ … El centro 
commercial de la ciudad, un lugar fantástico para las compras y donde abundan las tiendas de 
musulmanes, hebreos, e hindúes.’ (The commercial center of the city, a fantastic place for 
shopping and where there are many Muslim, Jewish, and Hindu shops.) Given the equal billing 
of the various ethnic communities, one might expect that they are each quite large. However, the 
tourist brochure reports that the population is 65% European and 30% Berber. Other estimates 
suggest that these two populations are roughly the same size and the Berber population is 
growing at a much faster rate (Elcano Royal Institute, 2014). 
 
The Jewish population is approximately 1,000 people (1.3%) and the Hindu population, less than 
100 (0.1%). The numbers do not quite add up because there is another group that accounts for 
3.6%, larger than either the Jewish or Hindu population, that is consistently left out of the four 
cultures narrative. Later in the brochure it is noted only once that the ‘Romany population’ of 
Melilla ‘is characterized by its dynamism’. Furthermore, the 1,400 migrants housed at any one 
time at the Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes (CETI) facility, again larger than the 
Jewish and Hindu populations combined, are also left out of the cosmopolitan European 
narrative. 
 
Melilla symbolizes the colonial history of Spain’s Golden Age and demonstrates the effort to re-
signify the landscape with a political–territorial mythology that connects it to Spain and Europe 
rather than the surrounding communities. The five-hundred-year Spanish presence in the city and 
the representation of the people and culture in cosmopolitan, multicultural terms emphasizes that 
the territory is a European place, although the history and current reality of military occupation 
belies the cosmopolitan narrative. As the political scientist Hansen (2002, p. 489) argued, 
 
The heavy symbolism that lies imbued in such a well-lit ‘enlightenment’ about where the 
barbed wire frontiers of the European Union lie in Africa, demonstrates how important it 
is to incorporate these EU ‘Non-European territories’ into our analyses of current 
articulations and definitions of Europe and of European identity. 
 
In other words, the institutionalization of Europe and its integration over the past six decades 
cannot be understood without understanding the ‘forgotten outposts of “EUrope”’ 
(Hansen, 2004, p. 60), because the legacies of colonialism and decolonization shaped a 
geography of Europe that extends beyond the physical confines of insular and peninsular 
mainland European space while the withdrawal from empires abroad provided incentives and 
justification for European integration during crucial moments of the last century 
(Bhambra, 2009; Hansen & Jonsson, 2011). 
 
MELILLA AS POSSESSION: TERRITORY’S CONTINUING ALLURE 
 
As a border town with little indigenous industry, Melilla is economically disadvantaged. 
Unemployment is over 30% in the city, and the nominal GDP per capita (€16,426 in 2013) is 
26% lower than Spain’s average (Eures, 2015). The largest employer is the public sector, and 
with several thousand military and Guardia Civil personnel based there, the city feels like both a 
garrison and an extraterritorial transfer economy. Seemingly, the city’s main function is to serve 
as an expensive-to-maintain gateway for migrants who are unwanted in Spain and the rest of 
Europe. Melilla is the source of an ongoing territorial dispute with an important political and 
economic partner, Morocco, and the Moroccan state would clearly like the territories back as 
evinced by at least 36 diplomatic and two militarized confrontations over the territories since 
1956 (Wiegand, 2011). The historical strategic military importance of the territories – protecting 
sea lanes of communication, as a bulwark against jihad and base for Christian crusading – 
appears very outdated. Why, then, does Spain hang on to Melilla and the other Plazas? 
 
When Spain and France decolonized Morocco in 1956, Spain maintained control over Melilla 
and the other Plazas by arguing that they were Spanish territories for centuries before the 
colonization of the rest of Morocco. In recent decades, the Moroccan government requested that 
Spain return the enclaves as former colonial possessions, although the enclaves are not listed on 
the UN registry of Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Moroccan government reiterated these 
claims as recently as 2007 in response to a visit to Ceuta and Melilla by the Spanish Monarchs. 
Mohammad XI, the King of Morocco, wrote: 
 
Given this act was to overcome a nostalgic and dark era, the Spanish authorities must 
assume their responsibility for the consequences that could jeopardize the future and the 
development of relations between both countries. […] Morocco has continued to demand 
an end to the Spanish occupation of Ceuta and Melilla and nearby islands in the 
plundered north of the kingdom. (Quoted in Cembrero, 2007) 
 
One possible justification for maintaining control over these extraterritorial possessions is that 
they provide a purpose for the Spanish military. The threat of Moroccan intervention and the 
daily incursions by migrants justify the existence of the military and provide a venue to 
demonstrate its continued relevance. As Andersson (2014) suggests, these territories create an 
important market for military contractors to continue to sell their wares (see also Jones & 
Johnson, 2016). 
 
Melilla, along with Ceuta, is part of Spain and the EU, but excluded from some European 
policies and rules. There is no VAT tax in the cities and they are outside the customs space of the 
EU, although products from the two cities can enter the EU without customs (European 
Union, 2006). As part of the agreement with other European states on the accession to the 
Schengen zone, Spain’s north African territories are exempt from passport free travel and 
therefore there is a passport check for passengers leaving the enclaves prior to admission into 
mainland EU (European Union, 1990). Thus, despite the dramatic visual effect of people scaling 
multi-layered fences to arrive in ‘Europe’ at Melilla, in fact migrants are not entitled to 
unencumbered journeys onward in Schengen Europe as one might expect. Quite the contrary, 
and this helps to explain why young migrants such as Osama spend long periods in the city 
awaiting onward passage to mainland Spain. Additionally, although Spain is a member of 
NATO, Melilla and Ceuta are not covered by the NATO Charter, so that any eventual military 
confrontation between Spain and Morocco over the Plazas would not legally compel the 
involvement of other member states (Wiegand, 2011). 
 
One explanation for Spain’s desire to retain Melilla, of course, involves the ‘continuing allure’ of 
territory as posited by Alec Murphy (Murphy, 2013). The symbolic value of territory far exceeds 
any rational, strategic calculus. Hanging on to these territorial pieces is central not only to 
strategy in a narrow military or economic sense, but also to nationalism, and hence territory’s 
continuing allure is largely rooted in assessments of a set of national interests that are as much 
emotional and symbolic as strategic (Murphy, 2013). That territory continues to play a central 
role in human affairs, in spite of academic attention to networks and flows, is confirmed by a 
daily scan of headlines. Murphy (2013) argues that states are unwilling to give up territory even 
when the social and economic costs are high, and that non-exclusive territorial sovereignty-based 
solutions to vexing issues – these might include condominiums, parallel statehoods, etc. – are 
rarely contemplated. 
 
However, it is also possible in Melilla’s case that the territory serves a wider purpose in 
sovereign states’ strategies to grapple with the territorial dimensions of increasingly globalized 
movements (Agnew, 2005; Sassen, 2013, 2015). A large body of scholarship in political 
geography and other disciplines has sought to problematize the misalignment of nation-state 
borders and the territorial strategies states employ to manage mobilities, such as the movement 
of migrants through space. Mountz (2013) has usefully summarized the ‘blurring’ of several 
facets of sovereignty’s spatial dualisms of inside/outside, onshore/offshore, etc. Along the same 
lines, Melilla illustrates the need to problematize the Africa–Europe dichotomy, since each exists 
within the other; the interface is anything but a near dividing line. All of this underscores the 
admonition by Hyndman (2012) that scholars should resist the urge to essentialize ‘the 
territorial’. 
 
Melilla and Ceuta are key sites of interface between the extraterritorial and intraterritorial 
dynamics of contemporary migration enforcement practices (Raustiala, 2009). Numerous studies 
have looked at the ways in which sovereign practices are mobilized extraterritorially, for 
example by setting up shop in transit states and compelling the cooperation of these states in 
managing movements through space (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, & Pickles, 2015; Collyer & 
King, 2015; Menjívar, 2014). Melilla falls somewhere in-between; Raustiala’s use of 
‘intraterritoriality’ is instructive here. This concept refers to the spatial differentiation between a 
legal core and periphery within the same juridical territory: ‘The resulting “borders” are internal, 
not international. The persistence of intraterritoriality stems not from Westphalian notions of 
territorial sovereignty, but instead from the challenges of liberal constitutionalism in a global 
context’ (Raustiala, 2009, p. 225). Melilla is an example of this challenge, where it mediates 
between the authority between Spain and the EU, at sites that are both sovereign territories of an 
EU member state but which are excluded from some of the legal frameworks EU membership 
affords. Melilla is part of a ‘graduated zone of sovereignty’ (Ong, 1999, 2006) that paradoxically 
funnels migrants to its imposing fences with the promise of arriving ‘in’ Europe while at the 
same time not being truly on the legal or territorial ‘inside’ of European space. As the below 
section on the nexus between geopolitics and biopolitics suggests, it is in this 12.3 km2 place 
where one can observe, as Nick Vaughan-Williams eloquently puts it, the ‘ … inherent 
ambiguity within EU border security and migration management policies and practices that 
(re)produces the “irregular” migrant as potentially both a life to be protected and a security threat 
to protect against’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 3). This highlights the contrast between the 
humanitarian logic of migrant rescue epitomized, for example, by Médecins Sans Frontières 
ships saving migrants in the Mediterranean and the continued enforcement of the border when 




Figure 3. Migrants on the fence in October 2014. Photo by José Palazón Osma. 
 
Back on the ground in Melilla, the contradictions of the place are hard to ignore. One of the first 
impressions of a visitor to Melilla is not the cosmopolitanism and diversity, as the tourist 
brochure suggested, but rather of a militarized and securitized place. On the drive from the 
airport and on subsequent walks through the city, we passed white and green Guardia Civil jeeps, 
brown and green Spanish army Humvees and trucks, blue and white local police cars, and the 
vans of private security contractors, mostly from the Spanish firm EULEN. There are Guardia 
Civil in the lobby of hotel, there are local police drinking coffee in the cafes, and there are 
military officers eating churros and chocolate in a restaurant. On the streets, the military men and 
women are always jogging. Sometimes in the black shorts and gray shirt while on duty. At other 
times in track gear and high black socks of an athlete in training. Indeed, one of the classic 
newspaper photographs of Melilla is of two white clad golfers at the military’s golf course in the 
foreground and the three-layered six-meter high border fence in the background, with migrants 
perched on top (Figure 3). 
 
MELILLA AS ISLAND: GEOPOLITICS AND BIOPOLITICS AT A EUROPEAN 
BORDER 
 
The why question of the value of this territory, however, remains largely unresolved and under-
examined. To understand the political geography of contemporary Melilla, one must consider the 
geography of extra- and intraterritoriality, on the one hand, but also the nexus of geopolitics and 
biopolitics on the other. We begin here with an examination of modern state system and the 
‘political architecture’ of Westphalian political order, which was, and continues to be, rooted in 
sovereign territorial authority (Franke, Weizman, & Geisler, 2003). Although Melilla is not 
literally an island, conceptually it is useful to think about it as one. The pre-Westphalian political 
order of feudal Europe saw multiple, overlapping, coexisting political authorities: the church and 
its physical structures existed as metaphorical islands not subject to the secular authority of the 
surrounding fief; city-states were islands in that they had their own sets of laws and provided 
sanctuary and financial havens, legally and physically separated from surroundings (Franke et 
al., 2003). Sovereign territorial states won out over rival forms of political organization in 
Europe because centralized, hierarchical administration of clearly defined spaces was more 
efficient at beating out rivals and lessening fragmentation, and they also were better equipped to 
manage international relations (they were better able to make credible commitments to foreign 
rivals and therefore achieve long-term gains) (Spruyt, 1994). As the Westphalian political 
architecture took hold over centuries, the domestic was domesticated: competing forms of 
political authority were purged or merged within the borders of the state’s territory, populations 
were disciplined, outsiders excluded, and multiple internal cultures were forcibly merged into 
one, which came to be known as the nation. The islands of refuge that had existed – church, city-
states, etc. – were simply exported to the margins of European geography, thus extending its 
frontiers. There they appeared, at least from the colonizers’ perspective, as the ‘outposts of 
civilization’ floating with the sea of yet un-ordered barbarity (Franke et al., 2003, n.p.). The 
creation of the modern territorially based state system of exclusive authority in Europe helped to 
create the conditions required for large-scale imperial expansion beyond Europe. 
 
Spain’s imperial conquests were vast, and the map of its extraterritorial colonies grew rapidly 
after the fifteenth century only to shrink considerably from the eighteenth century due to 
independence movements, wars, and decolonization. Melilla and the Plazas are some of the 
leftovers of extraterritoriality, and as much as some extraterritorial outposts have served as the 
‘physical infrastructure for the distribution of finance and strategic power’, others have become 
‘zones of humanitarian intervention’ or ‘military camps’ (Franke et al., 2003). The 
extraterritorial island, as in the case of Melilla, has become an integral part of Spain’s and 
Europe’s interior since mass migration turned the garrison to refuge, much like the walled city-
states of medieval Europe offered hope of refuge inside their walls. Along these lines, 
analytically Melilla and Ceuta are tantamount to the literal islands in Mountz’s work on an 
‘enforcement archipelago’ of ‘front-end border enforcement strategies’ (Mountz, 2011, p. 119; 
see also Baldacchino & Tsai, 2014; Bernardie-Tahir & Schmoll, 2014). 
 
It is at this point where it is useful to consider what this particular case tells us about the well-
rehearsed debates in geography about the relationship between biopolitics and state sovereignty, 
such as whether the two modes of governance are contiguous and coevolving (e.g., 
Agamben, 1998; Crampton & Elden, 2007; Foucault, Bertani, Fontana, Ewald, & Macey, 2003), 
or whether biopolitics is modern manifestation along a temporal continuum of state power that 
displaces the modern, territorial state (Hardt & Negri, 2000; see also Coleman & Grove, 2009). 
In short, we suggest that Melilla represents the co-evolution of geopolitical and biopolitical 
praxis, where, for example, the geopolitical and geohistorical macro-scale projects of Spanish 
imperialism and later European Union expansion and bordering meet the micro-scale biopolitical 
practices of population and mobility control. The intersection between the geopolitical and 
biopolitical realms has a long history, perhaps best exemplified by the application of Malthus’ 
work on population in racialized geopolitical projects of imperial expansion and hegemony 
during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). In the current 
era of rapid, globalized mobilities, securitized biopolitics, as Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero write, 
‘has become the imperial struggle not simply to seize territory, control resources or even 
reconfigure state apparatuses – although these remain traditional security concerns – but to 
secure the changing and manifold processes of global circulation as such’ (2008, p. 284). 
 
Melilla puts many aspects of the biopolitical and geopolitical on full display: detention facilities 
and camps both on the Spanish and Moroccan sides of the border (Minca, 2015), tall fences and 
hypersurveillance, and animalized discursive constructions of alien, diseased, unhygienic 
invaders (Vaughan-Williams, 2015) coexisting with tourist brochures celebrating 
cosmopolitanism and EU rhetoric proclaiming ‘freedom, security, and justice’. This interplay can 
also be placed on a historical continuum, since the colonial origins of Melilla was not just a 
bulwark of an expanding empire designed to protect against any further incursions of Moors into 
Iberia, but also as a prison (Gold, 2000). 
 
The border between Melilla and Morocco is a striking one, with three layers of fencing on the 
Spanish side encircling the entire 12 km2 area of the city and extending a short way into the 
Mediterranean’s waters (Figures 4 and 5). In spite of the border work that targets the bodies of 
migrants at the edges of Europe, Melilla is also situated in a regional setting in which cross-
border connections are vital to the function of the cities on both sides of the border. A new 
biopolitical control in the form of cross-border cooperation has emerged in the past decade as 
Spain, the EU, and Morocco have worked together to manage migration flows (Andersson, 2014; 
Collyer, 2012, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Most of the migrants crossing into Melilla are 
from central and western Africa, and typically arrive via the inland route via Niger and Algeria 
often with assistance of smuggling syndicates (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The first destination 
in Morocco is the city of Oujda, a sort of staging area for further travel to Nador, Melilla’s 
neighbor city. According to Collyer (2012), during the mid-2000s migrants spent an average of 
over one year in Morocco, and as a result of Morocco’s toughening of its own migration regime, 
were deported to Algeria 1.73 times on average. The tightening of Melilla’s border in the 1990s 
(when the first fences were constructed) led to sea crossings becoming more common, often in 
‘rickety wooden pateras’ that predictably led to numerous shipwrecks and deaths 
(Collyer, 2012). 
 
The 2005 events in Ceuta and Melilla played a catalytic role in shaping the current relationship 
between Morocco, Spain, and the EU. In the autumn of 2005, an estimated 1,400 migrants 
attempted to scale the fences around Ceuta and Melilla, and the reaction of border guards 
resulted in between 11 and 14 migrants being shot and killed, with conflicting reports as to how 
many actually died and which side’s border guards fired shots (Andersson, 2014; Collyer, 2012; 
European Commission, 2005; Natter, 2014). Spain pressured Morocco to increase patrols of its 
own coast, ostensibly as a humanitarian move to prevent migrants from embarking on dangerous 
boat journeys, but this simply encouraged even more treacherous journeys from more distant 
points of departure, such as along the Atlantic coast. (Collyer, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 4. Spanish border fence extending into the Mediterranean. 
 
Largely as a result of the embarrassment of the Ceuta and Melilla crisis, the European Council 
met in 2005 to develop new policies focused on migration management (Dünnwald, 2015). 
Subsequently, the EU initiated the Rabat process with partner states including Morocco and other 
North and West African states in order to integrate them into a more coordinated global, life-
cycle approach to migration and convince them that irregular migration was something to be 
controlled, not ignored (Dünnwald, 2015). The social organization of migrants, as well as the 
strategies pursued to reach Spain, changed as the Spanish and Moroccan governments – 
increasingly in cahoots with each other – adapted their migration controls to stem growing 
numbers. Moroccan patrols of the Algerian border in 2003–2004 led to secondary camps in 
Morocco far away from Melilla to be bypassed in favor of heading directly to Gurugu. Moroccan 
clampdowns in the wake of the 2005 events, made transit even riskier, in terms of both the 
prospects of removal and the threat of mistreatment at the hands of the police (Dünnwald, 2015). 
The Gurugu camp outside Melilla housed as many as 3,000 migrants in 2004 at its peak – the 
term camp must be qualified, as this was a campsite with no fixed structures and people living 
outside. After 2005, when this entire area of northern Morocco was declared off limits to 
migrants and patrolled by the army, those migrants who remained dispersed to smaller, more 
remote camps, until over time the numbers built back up to the estimated 1,200 irregular 
migrants who were removed by Moroccan authorities in February 2015 (Natter, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 5. Spanish fences in foreground, new Moroccan concertina wire fence in background. 
 
In February 2014, at least 15 migrants drowned attempting to swim around a seawall separating 
Ceuta from Moroccan territory as Spanish Guardia Civil officers fired rubber bullets at them 
prompting much outrage (The Local, 2014). In October 2014, the Spanish Law on Public 
Security was controversially amended to allow the Guardia Civil to push back migrants at the 
border 
 
Por último, respecto al régimen especial de Ceuta y Melilla, se dispone que los 
extranjeros que sean detectados en la línea fronteriza de intentan superar los elementos de 
contención para cruzar irregularmente la frontera podrán ser rechazados a fin de impedir 
su entrada ilegal en España (Finally, regarding the special regime of Ceuta and Melilla, 
foreigners that are detected at the border line trying to cross without permission may be 
rejected to prevent their illegal entry into Spain). (EL Congreso, 2015) 
 
The EU has provided resources to support Morocco’s migration management system since at 
least 2000, when the Association Agreement went into force and more recently via the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, & Pickles, 2013; Human 
Rights Watch, 2014). There have been a variety of target programs under the auspices of EU–
Morocco relationship targeting irregular migration, including the Aeneas Program of technical 
and financial assistance (2004–06) and Project Seahorse (2005–08) that entailed joint patrols 
between the Spanish Guardia Civil and Moroccan authorities. In addition to thematic funding 
streams, geographic assistance packages such as MEDA I and MEDA II (assistance to the EU’s 
Mediterranean partners) have provided well over €100 million to the Ministry of Interior to shore 
up enforcement capabilities (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The last 10 years have witnessed the 
emergence of ‘spatially mobile sovereignties’ of states acting to control unruly pathways of 
migrants beyond sovereign territorial limits (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015). Morocco was the first 
country to sign a bilateral mobility and migration agreement with the EU in June 2013. The 
agreement first emphasizes the normalization of student visas for Moroccans, but then addresses 
what it terms ‘irregular immigration’. The press release from the EU states: 
 
The EU and Morocco will work together in order to combat the smuggling of migrants 
and trafficking in human beings and to provide assistance for victims of these crimes. 
They will work closely together in order to ensure that Morocco can establish a national 
asylum and international protection system. (European Commission, 2013) 
 
These agreements have shifted the most exclusionary practices of enforcement to the Moroccan 
side allowing the image of Melilla as a space of cosmopolitan Europe to be partially maintained 
while the biopolitical control of migrant bodies is obscured on the other side of a barbed wire 
fence. 
 
Certainly, the existence of the fences gives some suggestion of how the Spanish and Moroccan 
states view this border, and thus the geopolitics of border enforcement in terms of ‘controlling 
access to strategically occupied compartments of topographical space’ is manifest in and around 
Melilla (Coleman & Stuesse, 2014, p. 36). However, a simple reading of the ‘spatialization of 
state authority’ around territorial borderlines such as Spain’s border with Morocco around 
Melilla needs to be problematized in at least two ways (Collyer & King, 2015, p. 186). 
 
First, the externalization of border controls by the EU (or ‘border outsourcing’, see 
Menjívar, 2014) has transformed Morocco and other North African states into a sort of ‘cordon 
sanitaire’ (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2014; see also Casas-Cortes et al., 2015), while the 
internalization of border enforcement (‘insourcing’) has added layers of additional restrictions on 
migrants’ bodies inside the juridical territory Europe. In the North American context, Coleman 
and Stuesse (2014) have referred to this process as the ‘implosion’ of border enforcement, where 
the objective of bordering becomes not just geopolitical but also biopolitical. In other words, in 
their attempts to discipline human mobilities, states seek to inscribe the border on migrants far 
beyond the actual borderline – to do so, states must seek assistance of a range of complicit 
authorities from local police and welfare agencies to foreign governments. Mezzadra and 
Neilson (2013) conceptualize these two modes of bordering as external qua exclusive and 
internal qua modulating – seeking to exclude migrations from the territory while also seeking to 
restrict possibilities of movement and action within the state’s borders. Even though the 
Schengen Treaty supposedly got rid of border checks between EU neighbors, the recent 
controversy between Italy and France over migrants being turned back by France near 
Ventimiglia illustrates that internal movement continues to be a politicized issue in the EU. In 
June 2015, Italian police forcibly removed around 300 African migrants from their makeshift 
camps along the rocky Mediterranean shore near the French border (Deutsche Welle, 2015). 
Despite similarities with Melilla’s migrant roundup of March 2015, Italy’s roundup occurred 
along one of the original Schengen borders, far from any external EU border where one might 
expect shows of state power to protect territorial sovereignty against the perceived threats of free 
movement. Thus, the intellectual distinction between the external and internal dynamics of 
borderwork blurs in contemporary European praxis. Further events of summer and autumn 2015 
along internal Schengen borders, such as the reintroduction of border checks between Austria, 
Hungary, and Slovenia, as well as between Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, underscore this 
point. 
 
Second, by focusing singularly on state actions directed toward migrants, there is a risk of 
overlooking the importance of migrants themselves as strategic actors capable of various forms 
of resistance that undermine notions of strict territorial sovereignties or biopolitical controls 
(Collyer, 2012). However, Vaughan-Williams reminds us that ‘ … while some commentators 
rightly highlight the importance of recognizing the agency of some “irregular” migrants in 
certain contexts, it is equally significant to note other situations in which the capacity for 
political contestation and resistance may be severely curtailed’ (2015, p. 59). Melilla and other 
similar sites are important to understanding the broader dynamics surrounding, and implications 
of, contemporary bordering practices. The material aspects of the geopolitical and biopolitical 
tactics of states are striking precisely because of the seeming irrationality of the entire enterprise 
seeking to restrict movement to an otherwise strategically unimportant piece of Spanish territory. 
 
Here, the concept of ‘immunity’, especially drawing on the work of the Italian philosopher 
Roberto Esposito, can shed light on the meeting place of sovereignty, states, and territory on the 
one hand, and human mobilities and biopolitics on the other (Campbell, 2008; Esposito & 
Campbell, 2008; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Esposito is best known for his examination of the 
relationship between community and immunity, or in other words how things that are shared in 
groups (community) relate to attempts to exclude or shelter the individual or group from 
‘expropriative effects’ of community (Campbell, 2008, p. 4). Campbell elaborates on Esposito 
further: 
 
When its individual members become subject to sovereign power – that is, when it is no 
longer possible to accept the numerous threats the community poses to itself and to its 
individual members – the community immunizes itself by instituting sovereign power. 
With the risk of conflict inscribed at the very heart of community, consisting as it does in 
interaction, or perhaps better, in the equality between its members, immunization neither 
precedes nor follows the moment of community, but appears simultaneously as its 
essence. The moment when the immunitary aporia of community is recognized as the 
strategic problem for nascent European nation-states signals the advent of modernity 
since it is then that sovereign power is linked theoretically to communal self-preservation 
and self-negation. (2008, pp. 5–6) 
 
The immunization paradigm as sketched by Esposito thus derives from a historical co-evolution 
of sovereignty and biopolitics, which becomes obvious when examining the subject of this paper, 
namely Melilla and the juxtaposition of Europe’s area of ‘freedom, security and justice’ with the 
migrant encampments in the surrounding hills where thousands of people await their chance to 
scale six-meter tall fences to reach ‘European’ territory. Spain’s vanquishing of internal enemies 
and establishment of territorial sovereignty, including the leftover pieces of empire such as 
Melilla, are rooted in the state’s power to protect the community, and its territory, from 
perceived internal and external threats, by a range of means that includes violent exclusion 
(imprisonment, armed border guards, etc.). Many other scholars, from Gilles Deleuze to Donna 
Haraway to Niklas Luhmann, have deployed immunization in their examinations of biopolitics, 
but Esposito most fully developed his thoughts on the co-evolution of sovereignty with 
biopolitics. Linking biopolitics, sovereignty, and territory to the logic of security that is 
responsible for the Melilla border fences, Giorgi and Pinkus (2008), drawing on Esposito, 
explain: 
 
The ‘outside,’ then, although represented and ‘materialized’ in spatial terms, seems to 
point to another dimension that is not exclusively territorial, geopolitical, or cultural, but 
fundamentally biopolitical: the dimension or the level at which human life is inscribed, 
constituted, recognized, and defined within a given sociopolitical order. What is deployed 
through the rhetorics and the politics of borders and boundaries, what the media stages in 
the spectacle of the territorial security and perpetual danger […] is a split or division at 
which ‘human life’ is separated from the unrecognizable, the residual, life reduced to its 
‘merely biological status’ […]. As the ‘outside’ becomes more proximate and immediate, 
violence intensifies. (pp. 99–100) 
 
As Nick Vaughan-Williams’ recent work points out, Esposito’s immunitary reading of borders 
builds on various, sometimes irreconcilable, accounts of biopolitics by Hardt and Negri, 
Agamben, Foucault, and others, by taking a ‘historically determined grid’ (modern system of 
sovereign states) inserting biopolitics (2015, p. 103; see also Agamben, 1998; Foucault et 
al., 2003). It therefore represents a counterpoint to the perhaps overly tidy Foucauldian 
transitions from territory to population and from sovereignty to security as the focus of the arts of 
government (Kearns, 2014). 
 
The changing political geographies of Europe over many centuries, from the emergence of 
Westphalian states to imperial expansion to now European integration, have necessitated 
encounters with the Other in a variety of contexts in Melilla and elsewhere. Recent high-profile 
encounters between migrants and European sovereign power in Melilla or in the Mediterranean 
cannot be separated from European policies ranging from the EU’s preferential treatment of 
Spanish tomatoes and citrus at the expense of Moroccan to structural adjustment policies in Sub-
Saharan Africa that have disrupted lives and provided incentives to move across the sovereign 
states’ boundaries. Hence, lives of people on the move such as Osama and Abou hit up against 
the immunitary logic of sovereign territorial spaces, where the state is allegedly protecting the 




Where does Europe actually begin? (Headline, Minder, 2014) 
 
The biopolitical and geopolitical transformation of enforcement is evident in the design of the 
fences around Melilla’s perimeter. Although earlier versions of the Spanish fences, built in the 
mid-1990s, had barbed wire, the current triple layer fence does not (Davies, 2010; 
Saddiki, 2012). Instead, it consists of a high outer fence, with wiring designed to prevent it from 
being pulled down, a shorter middle fence, and then a medium-height interior fence. Each of 
these is spaced with only a few meters between them. The fence also includes a road along its 
length to facilitate the movement of the Guardia Civil and many lights and cameras to identify 
movement and record events. The Spanish fence is termed a ‘humanitarian fence’ because it is 
not designed to injure migrants with barbed wire, concertina wire, spikes, or electrical charges. 
Instead, it defines the limits of European spaces, projects the power of the state into the border 
area, and functions primarily to slow down migrants long enough to allow the Guardia Civil to 
arrive and prevent their entry into Melilla, which only occurs when they make it over the third 
fence. Indeed, the International New York Times headline quoted at the outset of this section 
asking where Europe actually begins reports on a Spanish court case challenging the validity of 
not allowing refugees to claim asylum after merely reaching out and touching the Spanish fence, 
since it technically lies on Spanish territory. Reaching out to the border has a double meaning in 
this context, since the origin of the actual borderline around Melilla is a measurement of the 
radius from the fortification near the port where a cannonball could reach when fired. 
 
The real biopolitical violence of the border has been shifted to the Moroccan side. In addition to 
the destruction of camps and detention of migrants, Morocco began constructing its own fence in 
2014 with EU funds. The Moroccan fence is in stark contrast to the EU fence and baldly displays 
its purpose. There are guard posts every 100 m, a ditch to slow movements, and the fence made 
up of stacks of concertina and barbed wire. The many plastic bags snagged on the barbs warn of 
the violence it will do to flesh. Although the Moroccan security practices are there to support 
European exclusionary immigration laws and are paid for by European funds, it allows for the 
performance of humanitarianism on the European side, while still carrying out the dirty work of 
the border. The complex and fraught existence of the city of Melilla demonstrates the layers of 
colonial history and the ongoing territorial project of sovereign authority and the state. In this 
article, we argued that Melilla is constructed and imagined as Europe, as a possession, as an 
island, and as a node of interconnection in the Mediterranean region. The city is a contradiction 
that is simultaneously an outpost of the EU, a border between the EU and Africa, an island of 
extraterritorial practices, a site of free flowing trade and commerce with neighboring areas of 
Morocco, a site of the externalization of border work as EU neighborhood projects funnel money 
to the Moroccan security services, and a site of cooperation between sovereign states as Spain 
and Morocco have come to see shared interests in security. 
 
Melilla exists in a space where geopolitics and biopolitics meet. The ‘spectacle of territorial 
security’ and its accompanying violence (Giorgi & Pinkus, 2008) are most apparent in those 
places where the community’s outside is closest, a place, in other words, such as Melilla. 
Esposito’s immunitary paradigm helps to conceptualize the relationships between community 
and sovereignty as projected onto territory on the one hand (geopolitics of border enforcement), 
and human-focused tactics of states seeking to limit potentially harmful or expropriative 
exposure of the community to outsiders on the other (biopolitics of border enforcement). The 
Guardia Civil rounding up the usual suspects at Melilla’s port, or the x-ray machine discovering 
the folded up body of Abou in a suitcase at a border crossing help to illustrate the broader 
relationships between geopolitics and biopolitics as they play out on the margins of European 
territory. Although humanitarian concern for Osama or Abou is not completely absent, the 
political discourse in much of Europe suggests that the tragedies and indignities at Europe’s 
increasingly violent, deadly borders are simply the unfortunate side-effects of collective desire to 
inoculate and immunize against migrant Others who seek refuge in Europe in ever growing 
numbers. And of course, Europe is not alone in this trend. 
 
Melilla is a key site to understand the changing practice of border enforcement as neighboring 
country no longer see borders as only adversarial lines but also spaces for cooperation against 
issues that affect both (Longo, 2014). At the same time that Morocco condemns Spain’s refusal 
to return Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco, the two states cooperate on regulating the movement of 
migrants and smugglers along their shared borders. Europe’s ability to control migration is now 
completely dependent upon the willingness of transit states to play their part (Menjívar, 2014). 
The implementation of sovereign authority over the border is a key concern for all countries and 
it is increasingly clear that by working together they can address common threats to their 
performance and practice of control. 
 
Melilla is also a site to witness the callous and violent disregard for the lives of migrants. From 
the dusty and overcrowded conditions in the Centro Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes (CETI) 
housing center, to the concertina wire of the Moroccan fence; from the triple layered EU 
humanitarian fence, to new gates and observation points at the rocky shore of the port; from the 
empty migrant camps on Mount Gurugu to the mostly empty boys’ camp at the port; from 
Osama, who lost his life trying to balance on the precarious rock outcrops, to Abou who was 
stuffed inside a suitcase to be reunited with his father, the violence of the border is practiced and 
materialized in and around Melilla. These objects in the landscape and real experiences of human 
beings demonstrate how migrants are dehumanized and excluded in the EU border regime. The 
militarized practice of security in the military enclave of Melilla can be a window into the 
violence of borders and the exclusion of the undesired migrant, but only if we pay attention 
rather than averting our eyes. 
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